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RECENT CASES
WILLS-GIFT TO ADOPTED HEIRS-ADOPTION OF WIFE AS CHILD-By her
will, executed in 1914, Mrs. Luella Graybill set up a trust for her son,
Robert, for life. On his death the remainder was to be distributed to
Robert's "heirs at law according to the Law of Descent and Distribu-
tion in force in Kentucky at the time of his death".' Robert married
the appellee, Louise W. Graybill in 1922, and less than four months
later the testatrix died. In 1941, when Robert was 58 and Louise was
45 years old, Robert adopted his wife "as his legal heir at law and
child". Robert died October 28, 1955 without a child having been
born to him. Suit was filed by the trustee to have the court declare
whether Louise, as Robert's adopted child, or his cousins, as his
natural heirs, were entitled to the corpus. The lower court held
Robert's wife, as his adopted child, was entitled to the trust estate.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky affirmed (4 to 3).
Bedinger v. Graybill's Executor and Trustee, 302 S.W. 2d 594 (Ky.
1957).
This case is important because it makes a far-reaching extension in
the presumption that adopted children are included in a gift to heirs
of a designated person. It holds the presumption includes adult per-
sons adopted solely for the purpose of inheritance. It is also interesting
because the adopted child was the adoptor's wife. The case turned on
two questions, one involving construction, the other involving adop-
tion of the wife by her husband. The first question was, whom did
Luella Graybill intend to take the remainder? By the trust instrument
it was given to "the heirs at law of my said son, Robert E. Graybill,
according to the Law of Descent and Distribution in force in Kentucky
at the time of his death". Ordinarily the phrase "heirs at law" is con-
strued as referring to those persons who would inherit the property
of the designated ancestor if he died intestate.2 This means that
Robert's widow would take one-half of the trust fund and his col-
lateral kin the other half. In three Kentucky cases, where the gifts
were to the heirs of X "according to the Kentucky statute of dis-
1 Robert died in 1955. Under the statute of descent then in force, the order
of Robert's heirs was as follows: (1) issue, (2) parents, (3) brothers and sisters
and their descendants, (4) grandparents and their descendants, (5) spouse. In
1956, some eight months after Robert's death, the statute was amended by moving
the surviving spouse into position (4) and grandparents and their descendants into
position (5). KRS 391.010. Thus, if Robert had lived a year longer, his wife
would have been entitled to all his property since the other claimants were no
closer kin than cousins. The exact problem presented in Graybill can not arise
with respect to persons dying after May 18, 1956.2 Simes and Smith, The Law of Future Interests (2d ed. 1956), see. 728;
Am. Law Prop., sec. 22.59; Cambron v. Pottinger, 801 Ky. 768, 193 S.W. 2d 472
(1946).
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tributions",3 "under the present statutes of descent in Kentucky", 4 "in
accordance with the law laid down by the statutes of the State of Ken-
tucky",5 the widow of X was held entitled to her intestate share
(statutory dower). On the basis of language used in the instrument
these cases do not appear to be distinguishable from the case at bar.
Thus under orthodox construction and according to prior cases in
Kentucky, Robert's widow should be entitled in any event to one-half
of the personal property held in trust. This construction and these
cases were not, however, mentioned by the court, which for unknown
reasons apparently assumed the widow did not take statutory dower
in the property.
If the widow, as dowager, is eliminated, then (putting aside for the
moment the widow's claim as adopted child) the entire property would
pass to the collateral kin of Robert. There is evidence, however, that
the testatrix did not intend to include collateral kin within the term
"heirs". In 1922 she executed a codicil to her will which provided:
"If my son, Robert, dies without heirs, the estate is to be divided
between Foreign Missions and Kentucky Mountain School." When
"heirs" appears in the phrase "if X die without heirs", the uniform
construction is that it means "issue".6 The reason for this construction
is that very few people die without remote collateral kin (although
they frequently die without itssue), and thus it is hard to believe that
a testator had in mind a gift over only in the event no remote cousins
could be found anywhere. This gift over in default of "heirs" indicates
the testarix did not have in mind as "heirs" persons more remote than
issue,7 and thus she did not intend for the property to pass under her
will to collateral relatives of Robert.
In the case at bar it was assumed by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that the word "heirs" excluded collateral kin. "Doubtless",
observed the court, "the testatrix had in mind her son's family or his
lineal descendants. This is underlined by the codicil, which was exe-
cuted thirteen days before her son married.' 8 "Family" includes a
3 Clay v. Clay, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 295 (1866).
4Lee v. Belknap, 163 Ky. 418, 173 S.W. 1129 (1915).
5 Vandyke v. Vandyke, 223 Ky. 49, 2 S.W. 2d 1057 (1928).6 Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 2, sec. 730; Prewitt v. Prewitt's Execu-
tors, 303 Ky. 772, 199 S.W. 2d 435 (1947).
7 Because of this interpretation of the word "heirs", the collateral kin had to
attack the codicil as too vague to be enforceable. Otherwise they would have had
no standing to challenge the wife's claim. The trial court ruled the codicil was
too indefinite to be valid, but the Court of Appeals refused to pass on the matter,
presumably because it turned the case on the wife-adoption issue.
8302 S.W. 2d at 597. "The point is that the testatrix in this negative man-
ner at least expressed her will that the estate should not go to her son's col-
lateral kin in default of 'heirs'." Ibid.
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wife, and the court could have stopped right there. Since Robert
died without ascendants or descendants, and collateral kin were ex-
cluded by construction, the only person who could qualify as an "heir"
under the Kentucky statute of descent was his wife. But instead of
stopping, the court, like a woman torn between two hats, turned from
one construction to the other. Having excluded Robert's collaterals
in one paragraph, it did an about-face in the next and included col-
laterals, then in the following paragraph turned around again to ex-
clude collateralsA then wrote the rest of its opinion on the assumption
that collaterals were included. It is hard to reconcile a finding that
"heirs" excludes collaterals and a finding that it includes them.10 It is
possible that, in its desire to reach the intriguing problem of wife-as-
child, the court did not pay dose enough attention to the construction
problem and to its inconsistent statements relating thereto.
Assuming that testatrix intended to include collateral kin within
the word "heirs", a second construction problem arises. Did she intend
to include adopted persons as heirs? In 1953 the Kentucky Court of
Appeals in Major v. Kammer"' held, where there is no evidence of a
contrary intent, an adopted child comes within the term "heirs" and
will inherit through as well as from his adoptive parent. This decision
reversed the long-standing presumption that when a gift is made to
the heirs of a designated person, adopted children are not included.
In Graybill three judges dissented, saying Kammer should be over-
ruled and the presumption against adopted children being heirs
should be resurrected. What the dissenters urge would be, in the
opinion of most writers,12 a step backward, and it would clearly be
0 In the second paragraph, the court stated by "heirs" the testatrix had
"designated whoever might be entitled to her son's estate under the statutes in
effect at the time of his death", thus including collaterals at least to the extent of
one-half. 302 S.W. 2d at 597. In the third paragraph the court remarked that
had Robert "wished, he might have refrained from marriage and permitted the
estate to go to the charities as directed in the codicil." Ibid. The only explanation
of this last remark is that "heirs" does not include collaterals but does include
heirs acquired by marriage, i.e. wife and issue.
10 The only possible way of squaring them would be to say that the court
was talking in the first and third paragraphs of the meaning of "heirs" in the
codicil, in the second of the meaning of "heirs" in the will, and that the court
was construing the word to mean one thing in the codicil and another thing in the
will. But this interpretation-of dubious propriety-seems ruled out by the quota-
tion in the text to which footnote 8 is attached. Furthermore, such interpretation
raises the question whether a duly executed codicil excluding collateral kin,
although unenforceable because too indefinite, revokes any provision in the will
for collateral kin. Cf. In re Bernard's Settlement, [19161, 1 Ch. 552.
11258 S.W. 2d 506 (Ky. 1953).
12 See Kuhlmann, Intestate Succession By and From the Adopted Child, 28
Wash. U.L.Q. 221 (1943); Harper, Problems of the Family, 483-484 (1952);
Nimis, The Illinois Adoption Law and Its Administration, Social Service Mono-
graph No. 2.
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against the weight of modern authority.' 3 Nevertheless the dissenters
have a point, or more precisely, half a point. To presume that most
testators would intend for adopted children to take, when the gift is
made to the heirs of a designated person, makes sense in the light of
the contemporary feeling toward adoption. To presume they would
intend for an adopted adult to take is quite another matter.14 The
adoption of adults is almost always for purposes of inheritance, not
for integrating the adoptee into the family unit, not for creating a
parent- child relationship. Indeed, adoption of adults hardly ever
crosses the minds of most persons when they think of "adoption", so
accustomed are they to thinking of adoption in connection with
children. It is also apparent from the wording of the Kentucky
adoption statute that the legislature had children in mind. The
statute completely integrates the adoptee into the adoptive family and
cuts off all legal relations with his natural family. The separate sec-
tion providing that adults may be adopted with the same legal effect
as if they were children conflicts on its face with at least two other
statutes (to be pointed out later), and seems to be a not-wholly-
thought-through afterthought.
Yet with two sentences the court extended the presumption of the
Kammer case to include adopted adults. Said the court:
The Kentucky adoption statute1 5 "authorizes any adult per-
son to adopt any person of any age. It, therefore, authorizes any
adult person to make for himself an heir, irrespective of age." 16
18 Am. Law Prop., sec. 22.59, fn. 9; Meek v. Ames, 177 Kan. 565, 280 P. 2d
957 (1955). Cf. Carpenter v. United States, 168 F. 2d 369 (CA 3, 1948); Wood-
ward v. U.S., 841 U.S. 112 (1951), construing National Service Life Insurance
Act to allow inheritance by and from adopted children.
-14 TeKentucky inheritance tax separates legatees into three classes accord-
ing to their closeness to the testator. KRS 140.070. Class A legatees, who are
closest to the testator and pay the least tax, include spouse, parents, natural issue
and children adopted during infancy. Persons adopted after infancy are Class C
legatees and pay the most tax. This legislative judgment as to the natural objects
of a person's bounty is pertinent to establishing presumptions respecting adopted
persons. In both cases it is the feeling of most persons towards adoptees that is
being sought.
15 Act of 1940, Ch. 94: "(1) Any adult person who is a resident of Kentucky
may petition the county court of the county of his legal domicile for leave to
adopt a child or another adult.... (2) Any person may be adopted after arriving
ate age of twenty-one years as well as children before reaching that age.
The current statute, KRS 405.309, is substantially the same. For a discussion of
motives in adult adoption, see Strahorn, Adoption in Maryland, 7 Md. L.R. 275 at
276, 283 (1943).
16 302 S.W. 2d at 598. The court also cited one case in point, which held
a man could adopt a 43 year old woman of no kin and she would inherit through
him as his heir. Brock v. Dorman, 339 Mo. 611, 98 S.W. 2d 672 (1936). It is
pertinent to note that in this case there was testimony that the adoptee was reared
during childhood by the adoptor and his wife and that a parent-child relationship
had always existed. Hence the adoption was simply a belated recognition of a
parent-child status.
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Now this is a neat bundle of deceptive reasoning. The issue is not
whether by the adoption statute a person can make an heir for his own
property (to which the Court's reasoning applies), but whether the
presumption that adopted children are included in a gift to the heirs
of a designated person should be extended to cover an adopted adult.
This should turn on the court's reading of the public mind respecting
the power to send the property to an adult not related by blood nor
adopted during infancy, as well as on legislative declarations of policy
regarding adoption. With respect to the latter, the inheritance tax
statute17 is as pertinent as the adoption statute.
The consequence of this extension is that where there is a gift to
the heirs of a designated person, such person has the power (by going
through an adoption proceeding) of selecting the person who will take
all or part of the property. In the ordinary case where property is
left "to X for life, remainder to the heirs of X", X can send the prop-
erty on his death to anyone he chooses, provided he has no wife or
children. If he has a wife, she will probably get her intestate share
(one-half in Kentucky), and X will have power to dispose of only one-
half. If he has children, the adopted person would only get an equal
share with the natural children. But by adoption X can entirely
eliminate his ancestors and his collaterals. He can adopt, and thereby
give the remainder to, an old friend, his mistress, a favorite counsin.
In an extreme case he could arrange to sell the value of the remainder
to Y and adopt Y as his heir. Because he can adopt an heir for his own
property, does it follow that he should be able to do so with the
property of another? Is this what the average or the ordinary or most
testators intend? Perhaps not, but such is the effect of the holding.
Construing the words "heirs at law," the court could have given
Robert's widow all, one-half or none. The second major issue in this
case-which the court need never have reached-involved the startling
proposition that a man may adopt his wife as his child. By way of a
rule of construction the court had assumed that Luella Graybill in-
tended to include an adopted person within the phrase "heirs at law",
and the issue was: is the rule or presumption broad enough to cover a
man's wife adopted as his child after marriage? The court held yes.
If a man has the power by adoption to appoint the property after his
death to any adult, discussed above, there is no reason to exclude the
wife from the objects of the power. Adoption of an adult is principally
to provide the adoptee with a fictional legal status for inheritance
purposes, and it should be possible for the wife (as well as for friends,
cousins and mistresses) to have this status.
17 Supra note 18.
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However, reasoning from this status to result in other situations,
one can pose some rather bizarre questions. The woman is both wife
and child. Is the marriage incestuous? 8 Is the husband entitled to
claim two dependents on his income tax? If she divorces her husband,
is he still liable for her support as a dependent adult child?19 Since
the wife must join in a petition of the husband to adopt a child,20
is she her own child? If the husband adopts her as his child, and she
adopts the husband as her child, is she her own mother and her hus-
band her father and brother? There is no use in carrying these ab-
surdities further. All they do is point up the fact that a person may
have the status of child for inheritance purposes but for none other.
In reaching the result that a man can adopt his wife, the court
relied on the sweeping breadth of the Kentucky adoption statute: any
person may adopt any person. "The child so adopted shall be deemed
for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal con-
sequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and chil-
dren.. ."21 It seems clear the statute cannot be taken as broadly as it
reads. On its face it conflicts with the inheritance tax statute noted
above. And the court assumes it does not modify the requirement of
consanguinity for an incestuous marriage. Doubtless if wife-adoption
became a prevalent practise, other problems than inheritance would
arise which would require exceptions to the statute. But as pointed
out above, if any other person can by a technical adoption proceeding
achieve the status of child for purpose of inheritance, there seems no
reason to carve an exception in the statute and deny such a privilege
to the wife.
It should be noted that the wife's equities may have influenced the
court in the Graybill case. The husband had a bronchial ailment and
died "after a long illness which, in addition to imposing arduous
nursing duties on his wife, exhausted in expenses that portion of his
mother's estate which he was able to have advanced to him during
his lifetime. . . . As the record disclosed . . . many of the relatives
on the paternal side voluntarily wrote they wished Louis W. Graybill
to have the estate and refused to make any claim therefor; others
wrote they were entirely willing to abide by the decision of the Fayette
18The court noted that "KRS 402.010 declares to be incestuous only mar-
riages between persons who are of 'kin to each other by consanguinity' in speci-
fled degrees." Thus marrying an adopted child not kin by consanguinity is not
prohibited. 302 S.W. 2d at 600.
1 KIRS 405.020. And likewise, if he becomes destitute, must she support
him as an indigent parent? KRS 405.080.2 0 KRS 199.470.
2 1 Carroll's Ky. Stat. (1940 ed.); sec. 331b-8. Cf. the current statute, KRS
199.530(2).
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Circuit Court .... ,,22 Only the distant cousins on the maternal side
appealed. Without other resources the amount involved, $64,000, was
certainly not more than the widow would need for support.
The result seems to have been equitable and, indeed, since the
testatrix excluded collateral kin by her codicil, probably what the
testatrix would have wished if she could have been consulted. The
only thing disturbing about the decision is the court's placing it on
the broad ground that a person may adopt any person he pleases to
take a child's share in property given to his heirs. It is believed that
such a rule will come to plague the court, particularly when the life
tenant leaves first line collaterals (brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces),
and the court may exhibit a tendency to find on rather slight evidence
an intention on the part of the testator that adopted children not be
included when the "adopted child" was not adopted during infancy.
Such is the usual fate of a good rule of construction pushed too far.
Glenn L. Greene, Jr.
2 2 Appellee's Response to Petition for Rehearing, p. 8. On the other hand it
should be noted that this assertion by appellee's counsel was made after the
original decision was handed down, and that the case by pre-trial order was sub-
mitted for judgment on pleadings, stipulations and exhibits. These did not include
any facts relating to the wife's financial need or to her loving and dutiful care of
her husband. Any supposition that Louise Graybill had stronger equities in her
favor than any other widow was, on the record before the Court, conjectural.
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